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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

9 THE ESTATE OF MARC A. MORENO,
10 by and through its personal representative,
11 Miguel Angel Moreno; MIGUEL ANGEL
12 MORENO, individually; and ALICIA
MAGAÑA MENDEZ, individually,

13 Plaintiffs,

14 vs.

15 CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE
16 COMPANIES, INC.; CORRECT CARE
SOLUTIONS, LLC; and ASHLEY
CASTANEDA, individually,

17 Defendants.

No. 18-cv-05171-RMP

PLAINTIFFS' RULE 37(e) MOTION
FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
AGAINST DEFENDANTS
CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE
COMPANIES, INC. AND CORRECT
CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC FOR
SPOILIATION OF EVIDENCE

April 23, 2020

Without oral argument

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22 PLAINTIFFS' RULE 37(e) MOTION

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I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. (CHC) and Correct Care Solutions, LLC (CCS) recently confessed to destroying large amounts of discoverable evidence. CHC/CCS destroyed the evidence on purpose. They destroyed it permanently, so it is not recoverable. They did so after receiving a written preservation demand, after this litigation began, and in the face of pending discovery requests that called for the evidence they then destroyed. One motive for the destruction was to avoid “discovery risk” from the possibility of unfavorable evidence. And CHC/CCS only admitted to the destruction after Plaintiffs spent nearly a year persistently pursuing the evidence and seven months after the Court ordered it produced. CHC/CCS’s audacious spoliation implicates this Court’s power under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) to order terminating sanctions.

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II. RELIEF REQUESTED

Plaintiffs request that the Court enter judgment against CHC and CCS.

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On April 1, 2014, CHC contracted with Benton County to provide healthcare services at the Benton County Jail. *See* Decl. of Edwin S. Budge, Ex. A. The contract ran from at least April 1, 2014 until March 31, 2017. *Id.* After the contract began, CHC combined with CCS. ECF 1 at ¶¶ 7-8; Dep. of R. Martin at 12:2-4 (Budge Decl., Ex. G). For the balance of the contract, CHC/CCS provided on-site healthcare for inmates at the jail and employed the nurses and other healthcare professionals working there. ECF 1 at ¶ 8; Balson Decl., ¶¶ 27-28; Exs. 17, 18.

1 As alleged in the Complaint, 18-year-old Marc Moreno was taken to the
2 Benton County Jail and confined there as a pretrial detainee beginning on March 3,
3 2016. For the next eight days, leading up to his death on March 11, Mr. Moreno
4 was isolated in a “safety cell” near the jail’s booking area. During his eight-day
5 lockup, his healthcare needs were the responsibility of CHC/CCS and their
6 employed healthcare workers. Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Moreno died from
7 dehydration caused by the failure of CHC/CCS and their on-site medical workers
8 to secure proper medical care for him. *See generally* ECF 1 at ¶¶ 15-38.

9 **A. Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Demand for Preservation of Evidence**

10 About eleven months before filing suit, on January 4, 2018, Plaintiffs’
11 counsel sent a letter to prospective defendants, including counsel for CHC/CCS:
12 Craig McIvor of the Lee Smart law firm. *See* Balson Decl., Ex. 1. The letter
13 notified the prospective defendants that Plaintiffs were preparing to file a federal
14 civil rights lawsuit and invited a pre-filing mediation. *See id.* The letter’s
15 conclusion advised the prospective defendants “to preserve all paper and electronic
16 records that may be relevant to our clients’ claims” including “all e-mails and other
17 electronic and paper records regardless of where they are maintained” on various
18 topics relating to Mr. Moreno, as well as e-mails and records concerning policies,
19 procedures, protocols, investigations, inspections, reviews, training, budget data,
20 mental health services, and communications about healthcare at the jail. *Id.*

21 **B. Plaintiffs File and Serve this Lawsuit**

22 In May of 2018, the prospective parties mediated. Balson Decl., ¶ 4. At
mediation, Plaintiffs reached a pre-filing settlement with Benton County. *Id.*

1 However, no settlement was reached with CHC/CCS. Accordingly, on October 30,
2 2018, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against CHC/CCS (as
3 well as its employee Ashley Castaneda), alleging violations of Mr. Moreno's
4 Fourteenth Amendment rights leading up to and surrounding his death. *See* ECF 1.
5 Plaintiffs served CHC/CCS with the lawsuit on November 16, 2018. *See* ECF 5, 7.
6 Nine days after being served, CHC/CCS formally appeared through the same
7 counsel to whom the preservation letter was previously sent. *See* ECF 8.

8 Plaintiffs' 26-page complaint described the events during the eight-day
9 period between Mr. Moreno's arrival at the jail and his death. *See generally* ECF 1
10 at ¶¶ 15-38. It alleged that CHC/CCS medical personnel—including Defendant
11 Ashley Castaneda—were aware of Mr. Moreno's dire medical needs but that they
12 failed to take constitutionally-required action to address them. *See id.* at ¶¶ 34-36.

13 The complaint further alleged that the failure to secure constitutionally
14 adequate medical care for Mr. Moreno was part of a constitutionally deficient
15 pattern and practice, giving rise to corporate liability against CHC/CCS under §
16 1983. These included allegations regarding CHC/CCS's deficient health care
17 customs and practices, a pattern of failing to properly monitor and address inmates'
18 needs, failing to adequately train and supervise personnel, failing to ensure
19 adequate communication among health care staff and others, understaffing, and
20 other allegations supporting *Monell* liability. *See generally* ECF 1 at ¶¶ 45-48.

21 During the 2014-17 contract period, CHC/CCS employed at least 57
22 different healthcare workers on site at the jail. *See* Balson Decl., at ¶ 27; Ex. 17.
CHC/CCS's on-site workforce included licensed practical nurses, registered

1 nurses, health services administrators, medical assistants, and at least one doctor.
2 *Id.* Regarding Plaintiffs’ myriad *Monell* allegations—patterns, practices, and
3 customs before and after Mr. Moreno’s confinement and death—any of these
4 individuals might have communicated via e-mail with one another, with off-site
5 CHC/CCS managers, and/or with others regarding relevant concerns.

6 During the *specific* eight-day period of Mr. Moreno’s March 2016
7 confinement, at least eleven separate CHC/CCS healthcare employees were
8 working shifts on-site at the Benton County Jail. Balson Decl., ¶ 28; Ex. 18. These
9 employees, who were stationed in offices near the cell where Mr. Moreno was
10 isolated 24/7, would be a natural source of information about facts surrounding his
11 day-by-day deterioration and need for higher level care, as well as the *Monell*
12 allegations against CHC/CCS generally. Many would have routinely passed Mr.
13 Moreno’s windowed segregation cell and communicated with one another and/or
14 with CHC/CCS management. And all of them, like the nearly 50 *other* CHC/CCCS
15 employees who worked on-site at the jail before and after Mr. Moreno’s
16 confinement, were overseen by CHC/CCS’s off-site Regional Manager and
17 Director of Operations who, in turn, reported to upper-level CHC/CCS
18 management. *See* Declaration of Linda Gerhke, ECF 76 at 17 ¶ 2.¹

19 An employee roster produced by CHC/CCS shows that by the spring of
20 2017, CHC/CCS terminated *all but one* of the 57 employees who worked at the jail
21 during the contract period. *See* Balson Decl., Exs. 17 & 18. Thus, as of 2018, there

22 ¹ In the 2015-16 timeframe, CCS operated at about 400 facilities across the
country. Dep. of L. Gehrke at 42:12-19 (Ex. R to Budge Decl.).

1 were 56 *former* CHC/CCS on-site employees who might have used e-mail during
2 the contract period to communicate about *Monell*-related issues generally. Eleven
3 of these former employees worked at the jail during the days of Mr. Moreno's
4 confinement and might have used e-mail to communicate about Mr. Moreno
5 specifically. In addition, off-site CHC/CCS employees, like the regional manager,
6 oversaw Benton County Jail operations and attended a mortality review into the
7 facts surrounding Mr. Moreno's death. Budge Decl., ¶ 17, Ex. L.

8 **C. Plaintiffs Serve Discovery Requests on CHC and CCS**

9 On December 17, 2018, immediately following the parties' Rule 26(f)
10 conference, Plaintiffs served discovery requests on CHC and CCS. *See* Balson
11 Decl., at ¶ 6; Exs. 2 & 3. Plaintiffs' requests defined "documents and materials" to
12 cover all electronic data, "including the contents of e-mails," backups and
13 "information stored in, or accessible through, computer or other information
14 retrieval systems." *Id.* Plaintiffs demanded, *inter alia*, "all documents and materials
15 that mention, reference, or relate to Marc A. Moreno, including . . . e-mails . . . or
16 any other printed or electronically stored information." *See id.* (RFP 1). Plaintiffs
17 requested all investigative materials relating to Mr. Moreno's confinement and any
18 inquiry into the circumstances surrounding his death. *See id.* (RFP 2). Plaintiffs
19 asked for all materials relating to mortality reviews, morbidity reports, and similar
20 audits or reviews into Mr. Moreno's death. *See id.* (RFP 7)

21 Plaintiffs also demanded information relevant to the *Monell* allegations,
22 including materials reflecting training, guidance, practices, policies, customs, and
standards concerning inmate medical care at the jail generally. *See id.* (RFP 3, 11).

1 Plaintiffs sought information regarding formal or informal grievances or
2 complaints that people at the jail were not provided with appropriate healthcare
3 during the contract period. *See id.* (RFP 16). Plaintiffs requested materials
4 pertaining to prospective risk-management analysis about inmate deaths,
5 information regarding quality improvement, and information that might reflect
6 financial motives for failing to properly care for inmates. *See id.* (RFPs 16, 19, 20
7 & 25). Moreover, in a Joint Status Report, filed January 8, 2019, Plaintiffs advised
8 Defendants of their intent to pursue further discovery, and the parties agreed to
9 “use good faith in negotiating terms for the production of ESI [Electronically
10 Stored Information], including the form of production and the methods for locating
11 responsive records” moving forward in the case. ECF 15 at p. 4.

12 **D. CHC/CCS Fail to Respond to Discovery—Resulting in a Motion**
13 **to Compel and a Court Order Deeming Objections Waived and**
14 **Requiring Full and Complete Responses**

15 CHC and CCS failed to respond to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests despite
16 numerous entreaties by Plaintiffs’ counsel. Balson Decl., ¶¶ 7-14. On February 12,
17 2019, Plaintiffs were forced to file a Motion to Compel Discovery against CHC
18 and CCS. ECF 21. The motion was supported by a declaration from Plaintiffs’
19 counsel, which explained that CHC/CCS produced no discovery, made no
20 objections, and that their counsel repeatedly ignored inquiries about their failure to
21 respond. *See* ECF 21-1. The Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to compel, deemed
22 most objections waived, and ordered “full and complete responses.” ECF 31.

1 **E. CHC/CCS Secretly Destroy Discoverable E-Mails**

2 Starting in February of 2019 and irreversibly executed in early March (at the
3 same time Plaintiffs' motion to compel was pending)—*but entirely unbeknownst to*
4 *Plaintiffs*²—CHC/CCS permanently wiped out all e-mails and all backups of such
5 e-mails from the accounts of almost every former CHC/CCS employee who
6 worked at the jail, *regardless of their relevance to this litigation or pending*
7 *discovery requests*. Because the employment of 57 CHC/CCS employees working
8 at the jail during the contract period ended by the spring of 2017, this wholesale
9 eradication of discoverable e-mails necessarily included the e-mails of every RN,
10 LPN, and CMA employed by CHC and CCS at the jail, as well as the two Health
11 Services Administrators and even the on-site CHC/CCS physician—no matter the
12 topic of the e-mail or its responsiveness to pending discovery. The only exception
13 to this was a narrow hold placed on individual-defendant Ashley Castaneda's e-
14 mail account.³ Moreover, CHC/CCS permanently wiped all e-mails and all
15 backups of e-mails (regardless of employment status) that were old enough to have
16 covered the eight-day period of Mr. Moreno's jail confinement and the Benton
17 County Jail contract generally. Thus, even if off-site managers remained employed
18 with CHC/CCS in early 2019, any of their e-mails from the contract period and for
19 Mr. Moreno's confinement period were destroyed by CHC/CCS.

20 _____
21 ² Balson Decl., ¶¶ 29, 30; Budge Decl., ¶ 6.

22 ³ See Decl. of R. Strickland (ECF 76 at 10-11 ¶ 5); Rule 30(b)(6) Dep. of R.
Martin at 13:25-14:3; 41:20-42:25 (attached as Ex. G to Budge Decl.).

1 The fact, timing, breadth, and depth of this astonishing purge was only
 2 revealed to Plaintiffs' counsel at 9:42 p.m. on November 12, 2019 when existing
 3 counsel for CHC/CCS,⁴ faced with an imminent response deadline to Plaintiffs'
 4 *third* motion to compel, provided Plaintiffs' counsel with a sworn declaration from
 5 an Information Technology Security Manager who has "worked at
 6 Wellpath/CHC/CCS for the past 10 years approximately."⁵ The declaration of IT
 7 Security Manager Richard Strickland, served on Plaintiffs' counsel on the evening
 8 of November 12th and filed at 11:50 p.m. that same night, states, in pertinent part:

9 Starting in February 2019, the email account of every employee whose
 10 employment ended prior to this date, and whose account was not placed
 11 on a legal hold, was permanently wiped from the Wellpath Email
 12 System including the ("Storage Area Network") system Backup
 13 emails of each such account of a former employee not placed on a legal
 14 hold were also permanently purged from the Wellpath SAN as of
 15 February 2019. As such, unless there was an existing legal hold in place
 16 with Wellpath in February 2019, all email accounts relating to former
 17 employees were permanently purged from the Wellpath Email System
 18 and Backups located on the SAN.

19 To my knowledge, based on my review of the Wellpath Email System,
 20 the only legal hold placed on an employee who worked at the Benton
 21 County Jail in March 2016 related to Ashley Castaneda

22 All emails of current Wellpath employees older than 12 months are also
 permanently purged from the Wellpath Email System and cannot be
 recovered electronically through backups or forensic recovery methods.

23 ⁴ Existing counsel appeared for CHC/CCS in May 2019 and former counsel
 24 for CHC/CCS withdrew at that time. ECF 48, 49, 56.

25 ⁵ "Wellpath" is simply the new name for CHC/CCS. *See, e.g.*, Budge Decl., at
 26 Ex. G at 10:14-19; 12:8-11; 27:15-28:14 (excerpts from CHC/CCS Rule 30(b)(6)
 27 designee R. Martin); Budge Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. D.

1
2 Prior to February 2019, emails dating back several years were stored in
3 our Email System or Commvault backups. To my knowledge, all e-
4 mails of prior Wellpath/CCS/CHC employees not placed on legal hold
5 were permanently purged from this system and are also not recoverable
6 as of February 2019.

7 Decl. of Richard Strickland (ECF 76 at 10-11 ¶¶ 4-7).

8
9 **F. CHC/CCS Keep the Purge Secret, Give Misleading Discovery
10 Responses, and Repeatedly Assure Plaintiffs' Counsel that E-
11 Mails Will be Produced**

12 Not knowing that CHC/CCS had carried out a *sub rosa* purge, Plaintiffs'
13 counsel spent much of the spring, summer, and fall of 2019 trying to understand
14 why CHC/CCS was not producing e-mails and endeavoring to force their
15 production. CHC/CCS kept Plaintiffs in the dark about their purge and assured
16 Plaintiffs' counsel that e-mail production was just around the corner—failing to
17 reveal that the emails had earlier been destroyed.⁶ Plaintiffs' efforts to gain
18 production of e-mails after the Court's April 9, 2019 order included the following:

- 19
- 20 1) On May 2nd, Plaintiffs' counsel conferred with defense counsel about the
21 lack of e-mail production in response to the Court's April 9th order and wrote
22 a letter on the subject of e-mails and other discovery that had not been
produced. Budge Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. B.
 - 2) On May 20th, Plaintiffs issued a detailed and precise interrogatory to
CHC/CCS requesting that CHC/CCS explain with specificity the steps they
took to locate all e-mails. Balson Decl., ¶ 18, Ex. 8.

6
Plaintiffs do not contend that current counsel for CHC/CCS countenanced
the purge, were involved with it, knew of the purge until recently, or intentionally
misled Plaintiffs' counsel. It may well be that their clients misled them or did not
communicate the fact of the purge to them until recently.

- 1 3) On June 19th, CHC/CCS answered that email accounts “for all current and
2 former employees were searched” for the term “Moreno” and that
“[a]dditional information is currently being pursued.” Balson Decl., Ex 8.
- 3 4) On June 20th, Plaintiffs’ counsel wrote to defense counsel about their
4 commitment to pursue additional information concerning e-mail production
5 and received a response advising that “after exhausting all search efforts,
6 there is no additional responsive information.” Budge Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. C.
- 7 5) On June 25th Defendants supplemented their answer concerning the scope of
8 e-mail searches stating that “[n]o additional responsive information could be
9 located.” Balson Decl., ¶ 19, Ex. 9.
- 10 6) On July 3rd, after obtaining public records from Benton County showing that
11 county officials were e-mailing CHC/CCS before Mr. Moreno’s death to
12 express concerns about nursing competency, failing to follow procedures,
13 understaffing, and “making mistakes and putting the Benton County Sheriff’s
14 Office in a position of liability from a medical standpoint,” Plaintiffs issued a
15 new request to CHC/CCS for “all e-mails pertaining to CHC’s and/or
16 CCS’s compliance with its contractual obligations at the Benton County Jail
17 between April 1, 2014 and March 31, 2017.” Balson Decl., ¶ 21, Ex. 11.
- 18 7) On August 7th, CHC/CCS responded that they “do not possess” the requested
19 information. Balson Decl., ¶ 21, Ex. 12.
- 20 8) On August 14th, Plaintiffs’ counsel wrote to defense counsel explaining that
21 the former CHC/CCS Health Services Administrator at the jail testified in her
22 deposition to writing highly relevant e-mails to CHC/CCS management on
topics relevant to *Monell* liability and urged defense counsel, “Please produce
these responsive e-mails.” Balson Decl., ¶ 23, Ex 14 at p. 2.
- 9) On three occasions from late August to mid-September 2019, Plaintiffs’
counsel conferred with defense counsel about the lack of e-mail production
and was told that the issue was being addressed by an IT professional and that
CHC/CCS expected to produce responsive e-mails. Balson Decl., ¶¶ 24-25,
Exs. 15, 16. Plaintiffs’ counsel confirmed these exchanges in writing,
including the assurances from CHC/CCS that the matter of e-mail production
was being addressed by CHC/CCS. Balson Decl., Exs. 15, 16.

Eventually, it became clear that Plaintiffs’ efforts were for naught, thus
necessitating a third motion to compel (ECF 69). *Yet, throughout this entire period*

1 of time, Plaintiffs’ counsel was never informed of the earlier purge. Balson Decl.,
2 ¶¶ 25, 29-30; Budge Decl., ¶ 6. CHC/CCS only came clean on the night of
3 November 12th when an imminent response deadline to Plaintiffs’ third motion to
4 compel forced them to confess their purge of e-mails eight months earlier.

5 **F. CHC/CCS’s (30)(b)(6) Representative (1) Confirms the Breadth,**
6 **Depth, and Timing of the Purge, (2) Admits to the Destruction of**
7 **Potentially Relevant Evidence, and (3) Admits that a Primary**
8 **Purpose was to Avoid “Discovery Risk” of Unfavorable E-Mails**

9 Due to the admitted discovery violations by CHC/CCS, Plaintiffs gained
10 leave to conduct discovery about CHC/CCS’s spoliation. *See* ECF 80 (granting
11 stipulation regarding Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) Issues (ECF 79)). On December 19th,
12 Plaintiffs deposed CHC/CCS’s Rule 30(b)(6) designee—their Tennessee-based
13 Chief Information Officer, Robert Martin. In his deposition Mr. Martin
14 acknowledged the staggering breadth and depth of the purge, admitted to the
15 destruction of potentially relevant evidence, and conceded that a motivating factor
16 was to eliminate the possibility of unfavorable e-mails and lessen “discovery risk.”

17 Mr. Martin’s full 30(b)(6) transcript is provided herewith. *See* Budge Decl.,

18 Ex. G. His testimony confirms, *inter alia*:

- 19 1) As of early 2019, CHC/CCS/Wellpath collectively possessed *all* e-mails of all
20 current and former employees, including those of every CHC/CCS employee
21 during the relevant contract period and during the days of Mr. Moreno’s
22 confinement. Martin Dep. at 23:23-24:3; 26:2-7; 29:3-13; 31:22-32:2; 38:17-
24; 39:19-23; 53:19-54:10; 54:17-19.
- 2) In March of 2019, CHC/CCS/Wellpath executed a calculated, deliberate, and
permanent *nationwide* purge of millions of e-mails. *See id.* at 23:23-26:12;
27:3-9; 43:19-44:8; 58:24-59:18.

- 1 3) The purge was guided by upper-level in-house legal counsel for
2 CHC/CCS/Wellpath. *Id.* at 35:14-36:2; 82:17-83:2.
- 3 4) Termed a new “retention policy,” it was actually a new *eradication* policy
4 partly motivated by a general desire to get rid of potentially unfavorable e-
5 mails and thereby lessen “discovery risk.” *See id.* at 23:23-24:17; 26:2-12;
6 39:10-18; 43:19-44:8; 44:23-46:14. When asked whether CHC/CCS and
7 Wellpath took into account the desire to get rid of e-mails that might be
8 “bad,” Mr. Martin responded that “it’s certainly a consideration” and that “[i]t
9 was a factor for sure.” *Id.* at 45:14-46:14.
- 10 5) When asked, “Do you acknowledge that beginning in February 2019 that e-
11 mails with potential relevance to this lawsuit were permanently deleted by
12 Wellpath?” Mr. Martin stated, “I do.” *Id.* at 6:18-22.
- 13 6) CHC/CCS/Wellpath’s plan called for (and resulted in) the permanent deletion
14 of e-mails from current or former employees more than one year old
15 ***regardless of their substance or relevance to pending discovery*** unless
16 CHC/CCS/Wellpath decided to place a particular person’s e-mail on litigation
17 hold. *Id.* at 23:23-26:12; 39:10-18; 41:20-42:25; 72:12-23; 75:15-23.
- 18 7) Based on a letter from Lee Smart, dated January 16, 2019,
19 CHC/CCS/Wellpath determined that the only “key witnesses” in this case
20 were Ashley Castaneda and a non-CHC/CCS employee (Anita Vallee). Thus,
21 in this case, *only* Ms. Castaneda’s e-mails were exempted from destruction;
22 the e-mails of all former and current employees old enough to cover the
contract period and the period of Mr. Moreno’s confinement were destroyed
regardless of their responsiveness to discovery. *Id.* at 13:16-14:3; 14:10-20;
15:15-17:2; 18:13-19:8; 19:21-20:14; 23:23-26:12; 41:20-42:25; 67:9-71:18;
72:12-23. *See also*, Budge Decl., Exs. I & J.
- 8) Documents produced in connection with the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition further
confirm this: of the 57 employees working at the Benton County Jail during
the contract period—including all eleven employees working during the eight
days of Mr. Moreno’s confinement—the e-mails of all but Ms. Castaneda
were destroyed in early 2019 along with e-mails of off-site CHC/CCS
managers with responsibility concerning the Benton County Jail and others.
Budge Decl., ¶¶ 11-14, Ex. H; Balson Decl., Exs. 17 & 18.
- 9) CCS/CHC/Wellpath’s in-house Director of Claims, the person who made the
decision to retain only the e-mails of Ashley Castaneda, was also the person

1 who ran the in-house group that would have received Plaintiffs’ December
2 17, 2018 discovery requests. Martin Dep. at 35:2-11; 37:19-38:16.

3 10) The destruction of e-mails included all attachments to e-mails—again,
4 regardless of substance or subject matter. *Id.* at 72:12-23; 77:2-6; 78:5-11.

5 11) Wellpath is legally defending CCS/CHC and Ms. Castaneda. *Id.* at 34:10-18.

6 The full extent of the damage to Plaintiffs cannot be assessed because it is
7 impossible to know what the destroyed e-mails of these dozens of employees
8 contained. At a minimum, we know that CHC/CCS eradicated all e-mails relating
9 to Mr. Moreno (other than those of Defendant Castaneda) between and among
10 CHC/CCS’s on-site employees and others—whether contemporaneous with his
11 confinement or whether post-death. In-and-of itself, this is jaw-dropping. But
12 CHC/CCS also permanently destroyed all e-mails between and among CHC/CCS
13 on-site staff and others containing information about jail understaffing,
14 substandard practices, patterns of failing to follow jail medical policies, lack of
15 training, and/or other topics directly relevant to *Monell* liability.

16 Indeed, among *known witnesses alone*, CHC/CCS destroyed the e-mails of
17 its former regional manager Linda Gehrke even though she participated in a
18 mortality review concerning Mr. Moreno’s death, was involved in decisions about
19 his care prior to his death, terminated a CCS nurse after his death for failing to
20 follow policies and procedures, and had concerns about *Monell*-related issues
21 relating to understaffing and training. Budge Decl., ¶¶ 17-18, 22; Exs. L, M, H, R.
22 Ms. Gehrke admitted in her deposition that e-mail was used for nurse training,
daily communications with upper-level management about frustrations at the jail,
and possibly regarding her investigation into Mr. Moreno’s death and to express

1 staffing concerns. Budge Decl., Ex. R (Gehrke Dep.) at 18:10-19:2; 38:10-39:25;
2 86:3-23; 105:17-23; 106:2-6. CHC/CCS also destroyed the e-mails of the
3 terminated nurse—the same nurse who saw Mr. Moreno when he first came into
4 the jail, who worked shifts (largely as the only RN on duty) during the week of his
5 confinement, and who observed him dead in his cell. *Id.*, ¶ 18, Exs. M, H.
6 CHC/CCS destroyed the e-mails of the on-site Health Services Administrator, who
7 also participated in the mortality review following Mr. Moreno’s death and who
8 admitted to writing relevant e-mails. *Id.* at ¶ 19, Exs. N, H, L. CHC/CCS destroyed
9 the e-mails of its only on-site physician, identified by Defendant Castaneda as
10 having instructed her to “continue to monitor” Mr. Moreno the day before he was
11 discovered dead. *Id.* at ¶ 20, Exs. O, H. CHC/CCS destroyed any e-mails that
12 might bear on an undated letter by an unknown author contained in Defendant
13 Castaneda’s personnel file complaining that the “CCS medical staff at the Benton
14 County Jail have been struggling to provide appropriate, safe, and efficient medical
15 services” and warning of a “very obvious downward spiral in our attempts to
16 provide the medical services required.” *Id.* at ¶ 16, Ex. K. CHC/CCS destroyed the
17 e-mails of another nurse who discovered Mr. Moreno deceased in his cell. *Id.* at ¶
18 21, Ex. Q. And these are just several witnesses among the dozens whose e-mails
19 were indisputably subject to Plaintiffs’ retention demand and discovery requests.

20 IV. ARGUMENT

21 “Spoliation is the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the
22 failure to preserve property for another’s use as evidence, in pending or future
litigation.” *Univ. Accounting Serv., LLC v. Schulton*, No. 3:18-cv-1486, 2019 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 96062, at *2 (D. Or., June 7, 2019) (internal quotation omitted).

1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e), as amended in 2015, codifies the consequences if a
2 litigant destroys or fails to preserve electronically stored information:

3 FAILURE TO PRESERVE ELECTRONICALLY STORED
4 INFORMATION. If electronically stored information that should
5 have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation is lost
6 because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it, and it
7 cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery, the court:

8 (1) upon a finding of prejudice to another party from loss of the
9 information, may order measures no greater than necessary to cure
10 the prejudice; or

11 (2) only upon finding that the party acted with the intent to deprive
12 another party of the information's use in the litigation may:

13 (A) presume that the lost information was unfavorable to the party;

14 (B) instruct the jury that it may or must presume the information
15 was unfavorable to the party; or

16 (C) dismiss the action or enter a default judgment.

17 In the context of Rule 37(e), the duty to preserve electronic data is “defined
18 very broadly” and extends to all such information reasonably calculated to lead to
19 the discovery of admissible evidence. *Brewer v. Leprino Foods*, No. 1:16-1091,
20 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14194, at *26 (E.D. Cal., Jan 29, 2019) (internal quotations
21 omitted) (citing *Leon v. IDX Sys., Corp.*, 464 F.3d 951, 959 (9th Cir. 2006)). The
22 standard of proof for Rule 37(e) motions is the preponderance of evidence.
OmniGen Research, LLC v. Wang, 321 F.R.D. 367, 372 (D. Or. 2017).

The duty to preserve evidence extends not only to parties, but also to any
interested third-party or their agents who have access or control of the evidence
and are providing the defendants' legal defense. *See Kindred v. Price*, No. 1:18-cv-
00554, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160922, at *2 (E.D. Calif., Sept. 19, 2019); *Ramos*

1 *v. Swatzell*, No. 12-1089, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103014, at *18 (C.D. Calif., June
2 5, 2017); *Dykes v. BNSF Ry. Co.*, No. C17-1549, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39718, at
3 *18 (W.D. Wash., Mar. 12, 2019). When a party claims to have relied on counsel’s
4 advice, the actions of the attorney are imputed to the spoliating party. *Victor*
5 *Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc.*, 269 F.R.D. 497, 515 n. 23 (D. Md. 2010).

6 Under Rule 37(e), and as explained in the Rule’s Advisory Notes, a finding
7 of intentional destruction eliminates any requirement that the moving party show
8 prejudice in order to be entitled to relief up to and including the entry of a default
9 judgment. *OmniGen Research*, 321 F.R.D. at 371-72 (D. Or. 2017). This is
10 because a party that destroys electronic data puts the moving party in the
11 impossible position of proving the consequences of what was lost. *Id.*

12 “Intent” is not defined in Rule 37(e). Courts applying Rule 37(e) rely on the
13 willfulness standard set out by the Ninth Circuit in *Leon v. IDX Sys., Corp.*, 464
14 F.3d 951 (2006). Under this standard, “[a] party’s destruction of evidence qualifies
15 as willful if the party has ‘some notice that the documents were potentially relevant
16 to litigation before they were destroyed’” but destroys them anyway. *OmniGen*,
17 321 F.R.D. 321 at 371 (quoting *Leon*, 464 F.3d at 959). *See also, HP Tuners, LLC*
18 *v. Sykes-Bonnett*, No. 3:17-cv-05760, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175748, at *10
19 (W.D. Wash., Sept. 16, 2019); *CrossFit, Inc. v. Nat’l Strength & Cond. Assn.*, No.
20 14-cv-1191, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209319, at *29 (S.D. Cal., Dec. 4, 2019).⁷

21 _____
22 ⁷ CCS knows that “[p]roduction of e-mails is a standard request in all civil
cases” that they *must* be preserved, and has been warned against their spoliation.

1 In this case, unlike those involving destruction of evidence pre-litigation,
2 there is no debate about CHC/CCS's notice of their relevance. When they were
3 purged, litigation was not a mere possibility or even a probability—the litigation
4 was active. Not only that, but the e-mails were the subject of discovery requests
5 issued 2-3 months before the purge, and a preservation demand nearly a year
6 before that. Plaintiffs had also notified the Court and counsel of Plaintiffs' intent to
7 continue discovery and CHC/CCS agreed to use good faith in ESI searches.⁸

8 Nor is there any dispute that the purge was intentional. CHC/CCS did not,
9 for example, simply fail to protect their computer systems or accidentally allow the
10 e-mails to be deleted as part of an existing destruction protocol. Instead, they
11 willfully and permanently wiped not only the primary stores, but also all backup
12 files. Moreover, the purge was not implemented naively. Rather, it was executed
13 with substantial input from the companies' own claims director and in-house
14 counsel. *See* Budge Decl., Ex. G (Martin Dep.) at 35:2-36:2. On the record before
15 the Court, it is objectively clear that CHC/CCS took intentional action to
16 permanently erase discoverable data *en masse* in existing litigation when its
17 discoverability was squarely on the table.

18
19 *See Rembert v. Cheverko*, No. 12-cv-9196, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138719 at *11
20 and 13 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2015) (warning CCS about e-mail spoliation).

21 ⁸ As healthcare providers at a public jail, CHC/CCS were likely subject to
22 Washington's Public Records Act, further underscoring their brazenness. *Clarke v.*
Tri-Cities Animal Care & Control Shelter, 181 P.3d 881 (Wn. App. 2008).

1 In considering the appropriate sanctions under Rule 37(e), the Court should
2 consider five factors: (1) the public's interest in expeditions resolution of the
3 litigation; (2) the Court's need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the
4 party seeking sanctions; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their
5 merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. *See HP Tuners*, 2019 U.S.
6 Dist. LEXIS 175748, at *12-13 (citing *Leon*, 464 F.3d at 958-59 and *Anheuser-*
7 *Busch v. Natural Beverage Distribs.*, 69 F.3d 337, 348 (9th Cir. 1995)). Each of
8 these factors weighs in favor of a default judgment against CHC/CCS.

9 The first two factors weigh heavily in favor of default. By destroying
10 evidence and failing to admit it for many months—even while Plaintiffs
11 persistently pursued the evidence and explanations for its non-production and
12 occupied the Court with motions to compel—CHC/CCS multiplied the expense of
13 this case, misled Plaintiffs and the Court, and obscured the factual underpinnings
14 of the case while deadlines passed and trial approached. Indeed, had Plaintiffs not
15 filed a third motion to compel, and instead relied on assurances of CHC/CCS that
16 discoverable e-mails just did not exist, the fact of the purge (let alone its scope)
17 would never have been known. When the destruction of ESI causes unnecessary
18 motions and misleads the other party, a default judgment is favored. *See*
19 *Christoffersen v. Malhi*, No. 16-08055, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94700 at *9 (D.
20 *Az.*, June 20, 2017). *See also Leon*, 464 F.3d 951, 958 at n. 1. Moreover, it would
21 be wholly unfeasible to remedy the spoliation short of default—e.g. by re-opening
22 discovery for Plaintiffs to depose dozens of ex-employees about faded memories of
years-old emails, supplement expert reports and so on. And it would be impossible
to do so without massive delay and gross disruption to the docket.

1 The third factor, “*risk of prejudice*” to Plaintiffs, and the fourth factor,
2 “public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits,” both weigh heavily in
3 favor of default. CHC/CCS’s destruction of e-mails from *at least 57* former on-site
4 employees (and others off site) carries a high probability that information about
5 Mr. Moreno’s confinement was lost, that vast amounts of impossible-to-replicate
6 *Monell* evidence was destroyed, that Plaintiffs’ experts have been deprived of
7 information, and that Plaintiffs have otherwise been robbed of evidence.⁹ The
8 purge also hid the importance of possible witnesses (since it is not practical to
9 depose 57+ witnesses, but e-mails would have identified anyone who corresponded
10 about *Monell*-related issues), and hampered Plaintiffs’ ability to carry their burden
11 of proof (a burden that *depends* on *Monell* evidence). It is impossible to say what
12 might have existed—whether there were smoking guns that could have proved
13 Plaintiffs’ case or whether the e-mails would have simply bolstered Plaintiffs’
14 claims. But the best source of *Monell* evidence were CHC/CCS’s own employees,
15 and there is no substitute for contemporaneous emails about the customs and
16 practices of CHC/CCS’s jail employees. And besides just liability, the trove of
17 destroyed e-mails from CHC/CCS jail employees (or people higher up who knew
18 of deficient practices there) could have enhanced Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive
19 damages. The destruction thwarted the disposition of this case on its merits.

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⁹ In jail death cases, the inmate’s death causes an “asymmetry of information
beyond what is typical in similar cases.” *See Blodgett v. Correct Care Sols., LLC*,
No. 17-cv-2690, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209535, at *16 (D. Colo., Dec. 12, 2018).

1 As to the fifth factor, the only available sanction short of default would be an
2 instruction that the jury must presume the evidence was unfavorable. This remedy
3 is insufficient because it cannot fully compensate for the possibility that the e-
4 mails would have helped Plaintiffs much more than a mere “presumption” of
5 unfavorability. Merely presuming that the e-mails were unfavorable begs the
6 question of *how* unfavorable. Would the instruction allow the jury to speculate
7 whether the destroyed e-mails were very unfavorable or only moderately so? And
8 how could such an instruction compare to *showing* the jury e-mails among
9 employees revealing, for example, their specific knowledge of Mr. Moreno’s daily
10 deterioration and lack of care, the companies’ notice of understaffing,
11 management’s cutting corners by refusing to budget appropriate amounts for
12 inmate care, consistent complaints by CHC/CCS employees to CHC/CCS
13 management about deficient training, the customary failure to follow health care
14 protocols, or any number of other kinds of incriminating evidence? How would
15 such an instruction impact the question of punitive damages? What about the fact
16 that the e-mails could have led to key witnesses who could expand on their e-mails
17 in oral testimony? In short, unlike other cases where specific documents were
18 destroyed, it would be very difficult to craft an instruction that remedies the harm
19 done by this purge and the magnitude of its scope. An instruction would give
20 Plaintiffs far less than the destroyed information itself might have provided.

21 IV. CONCLUSION

22 For the reasons stated above, the Court should enter a default judgment
against CHC/CCS.

1 Respectfully submitted this 4th day of March, 2020.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that on the date stated below this document was filed with the Clerk of the Court for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, via the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the following e-mail addresses:

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